The recent Great Recession in the United States and the European Union has generated renewed interest in the management of macro-economic fiscal policy within economic and monetary unions. The received wisdom is that such fiscal policies will be efficient only if they are carried out by an overarching central government. Wallace Oates (1972) in his classic treatise on fiscal federalism concludes:
The case for having the central government assume primary responsibility for the stabilization function appears, therefore, to rest on a firm economic foundation. . . . (L)ocal government cannot use conventional stabilization tools to much effect and must instead rely mainly on beggar-thy-neighbor policies, which from a national standpoint are likely to produce far from the desired results. The central government, on the other hand, is free to adopt monetary policies and fiscal programs involving deficit finance; consequently, the stabilization problem must be resolved primarily at the central government level (p. 30).
Within economic and monetary unions, deficits by lower tier governments, either states or member countries, are viewed as ineffective for restoring employment within the local economy. Deficits may stimulate local demand for goods and services, but because those goods and services are produced and traded within the wider union, the impact on local employment is thought to be modest at best.
Even if there are increases in local employment opportunities, they may be "diluted" by the entry of workers from another state or country. Because of demand spillovers or worker mobility, therefore, any employment benefits derived from the deficit will accrue to all members of the union, while future tax costs remain the responsibility of the deficit-creating jurisdiction. If so, we have a public goods spillover and a need for coordinated fiscal policies managed by the union's central government.
We test empirically for the two important "facts" behind this familiar conclusion: Do local fiscal policies impact the aggregate performance of the local economy for the benefit of state residents, and are there significant economic spillovers? Using U.S. data from 1973-2009 for the 1 48 mainland states, we first examine the impact of state governments' own deficits on each individual state's own rate of establishment employment growth and, because these are open economies, state population growth due to net migration. Unique to this study, our measure of state deficits is explicitly specified to capture the full impact of state budgets on state economies and includes not just the usual general fund deficit but also deficits in the state capital accounts and in the state trust fund accounts, including public employee pensions; see Section II. Section III provides our specification for the impact of fiscal policies on state economies within an economic and monetary union as well as two specifications for how one state's policies might impact the economies of its "economic neighbors." Section IV presents our core empirical results. We find that temporary state deficits do have a positive impact on the rate of employment growth within the state (Table 2 ) and a modest and statistically insignificant effect on state population growth because of net migration (Table 3 ). There is a small reduction in the state's rate of unemployment (Table 3) . We conclude that most of a state's employment growth must be satisfied by residents returning to the work force -that is, by a rise in a state's rate of labor force participation. Section IV (Table 2 ) also provides estimates for the effects of the deficit's two main components on job growth. It is state net revenues (taxes and fees minus transfers) rather than state spending for goods and services that has the primary effect on local employment. We compute an impulse response function for a temporary one-year increase in state deficits and find that the employment effects are relatively short-lived; state employment growth returns to its equilibrium level after one year (Figure 3 ). Job growth declines eight years after the initial increase in debt as taxes rise to cover scheduled debt repayments.
In addition to the positive, though temporary, impact on its own economy, state own deficits also impact the job growth of their economic neighbors, specified as states with common patterns of economic fundamentals, e.g., the older industrial states of the upper Midwest or the energy region of the Gulf Coast and Mountain states. The aggregate regional impact is roughly two-thirds of a state's own impact, suggesting significant spillover effects ( Table 2) . The results parallel those found for fiscal policy interdependencies across EU economies; see, for example, Beetsma and Giuliodori (2011) , Hebous and Zimmerman (2012) , and Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012) .
Section V (Table 4 ) summarizes the job impacts and the present value tax cost per job created from a temporary one-standard-deviation increase in state own deficits. Estimates are calibrated to states' economies at the start of the Great Recession. The present value of the future tax costs per job created for each deficit state range from $72,000/job to perhaps as much as $91,000/job. Importantly, when we include positive job spillovers to neighboring states, "collective" tax costs fall to $44,000/job to $53,000/job. Given significant spillovers, each state has an incentive to free-ride on the deficit policies of its economic neighbors. If so, the results argue for fiscal policy coordination for macro-economic stabilization. From the U.S. evidence, the familiar conclusion from Oates stands.
II. Measuring State Deficits
In contrast to previous studies focusing on state general fund deficits and state economies, we are the first to develop and use an encompassing definition of state deficits, one defined as the difference between state expenditures and state revenues for all state funds. Included in our measure of state deficits are the state's general fund, the state's capital fund, the state's unemployment and workers' compensation insurance funds, and state-administered pension funds. For each of the state's four fund accounts, we use a cash accounting measure of deficits, defined as the difference between 3 money spent by the state in each account less revenues received by each account during the government's fiscal year (FY). Deficits are dated by the fiscal year typically beginning on July 1 and ending on June 30 -for example, deficits in FY 2000 are for the period July 1, 1999 to June 30, 2000.
Included in the general fund deficit are expenditures for wages and salaries and pension contributions for state employees, transfers to households (including Medicaid payments), transfers to local governments, maintenance of state infrastructure, and payments for supplies. General fund revenues include all taxes, fees, licenses, and federal aid (including "aid" paid as part of the national tobacco settlement) into the general fund. Included in the capital fund are expenditures for all new construction; fees collected from the use of existing infrastructure have been included as part of general fund revenues. Included in insurance and pension fund expenditures are all payments to households for workers' compensation, unemployment benefits, and all payments to retired and disabled public employees. Included as revenues for the insurance and pension funds are the annual payments by state employers into the unemployment and workers' compensation funds plus pension contributions from covered state and local employees, from local governments whose employees are members of the state pension plan, and the state's own pension contributions. Since the state's own contributions to the pension fund are also counted as a state general fund expenditure, these payments are an internal transfer and have no implication for the aggregate state deficit as measured here.
Importantly, even when a state's general fund deficit is constrained by an effective balanced budget rule, the state's capital, insurance trust, and pension deficits are not. Deficits in each account can be funded by short-term or long-term borrowing or by drawing down accumulated reserves in each of the funds. Fund reserves are fungible across accounts. Importantly, states with effective balanced budget rules can still run significant deficits for aggregate demand management. All deficits and 4 supporting fiscal variables are measured in real dollars with a state-specific price deflator set equal to 1.00 for Wyoming in 2004.
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In our empirical analysis of the impact of state deficits on state economies, we do not use total state deficits, but rather total state own deficits, denoted hereafter as OwnD and defined as total state deficits minus all federal aid paid to the state. We use OwnD for two reasons. First, we wish to focus on the role of the state's own fiscal policies on its own economy. Including federal aid in our definition of state deficits compounds federal and state fiscal policies. Second, both total and own deficits are likely to be endogenous to the state's economy. We will therefore need instruments so that unbiased estimates of the effects of state deficits on state employment and population growth can be obtained. Effective instruments are more likely to be available from variation in state fiscal environments. Our analysis includes an exogenous measure of federal aid as a separate regressor, however. Figure 1a shows the historical path of the national (population weighted) average of total and state own deficits for the 48 mainland states for our sample period, where both deficit measures are defined as expenditures minus revenues and will be positive (negative) when there is a deficit (surplus) in the budget. The gap between own and total deficits is the average level of federal aid given to the sample states. It is clear that, without this assistance, states would require a significant increase in state revenues or cuts in state spending to balance their aggregate budgets. Figure 1b show the ratio of total deficits and total own deficits to national GDP. On average U.S. states have run small surpluses over the years on their combined budgets; the exceptions are the 1 All fiscal data for our analysis come from the Census of Governments, State Government Finances, various years. The price deflator is from Craig and Inman (1982) , updated by the national urban CPI for those years for which state-specific indices are not available. fiscal year without the ability to carry over a deficit from one fiscal year to the next. The remaining states show significant variation over time in their relative rankings for own deficits, many moving between quartile rankings, and some dramatically so (Massachusetts, Utah, Idaho, New Mexico, and North Dakota). It will be this across-state and within-state over time variation in own deficits that we use to identify the impact of state fiscal policy on state economies.
III. State Deficits and State Economies
A. State Economy: Our understanding of the potential impact of state deficits on state economies begins with the equilibrium framework for open economies in economic and monetary unions; see Haughwout and Inman (2001) . All states compete in the world economy and receive the 6 competitive world price (p) for their outputs. Technology is constant returns to scale in labor, capital, and land, defined uniquely for each local jurisdiction by the production "amenities" of the jurisdiction (A F ). Factor prices for labor (W) and land (R) are determined in the local market, while the price of capital (r) is set in the world market. Firms pay a tax per unit of output (t F ) and obtain productive public goods and services (G F ). Profits will equal the world price for the state's output minus average costs minus taxes per unit of output (t F ). In equilibrium, firms make zero excess returns. Thus:
Labor is supplied by state residents at a constant level of hours per year. Each working resident earns the market wage (W) and that income less local household taxes (t H ) is allocated to the consumption of goods and services produced locally or imported, to housing services, and to the purchase of land. Households within a state pay the market price (R) for the land they consume.
Households receive residential public goods and services (G H ) and enjoy residential amenities (A H ).
Household welfare is specified by their indirect utility function as:
where in equilibrium every household in a state receives the exogenously determined level of utility (Û) available from living in any other state. Labor mobility is assumed.
Equilibrium allocations within the state are determined in two steps. First, Eqs. (1) and (2) are solved jointly to specify equilibrium wages and rents, conditional upon local fiscal policies (t F , G F , t H , G H ), world prices (r and p), and local production and residential amenities (A F , A H ). Second, aggregate output and thus the final size of the local economy is determined by the availability of productive land within the jurisdiction (‹ s ); see Haughwout and Inman (2001) . Land demanded by firms and households is equal to the exogenous supply of land to define equilibrium gross state product (X):
equilibrium state employment (N):
and the equilibrium number of households (H) needed to supply N:
where μ is the equilibrium rate of labor force employment.
Equations (3)- (5) provide the starting point for our empirical analysis. We focus on the net impact of state own deficits (OwnD), defined here as state expenditures minus state own revenues:
In particular we are interested in the effects of a temporary increase in OwnD on changes in gross state product (X), state employment (N), state population (H), and temporary changes in the rate of employment (μ) as the economy adjusts to a new equilibrium.
Our empirical analysis will also test for the separate effects of state spending (G F + G H ) and state own revenues (t F CX + t H CH), denoted hereafter as GovServices and OwnNetRev, respectively.
A positive impact of temporary state deficits on the local private economy may occur in either of three cases. First, if firms and households fully anticipate the future tax burden of current deficits -the case of Ricardian equivalence -but local government services add more to productive efficiency and household utility than current and anticipated taxes, then firms will increase their demand for labor, and workers will be attracted to the region. Here the temporary deficit creates a permanent improvement in the state's productive or residential environments. Capital spending may 8 be an example.
Second, if firms or households within the state are credit-constrained, temporary state deficits can ease that constraint by financing current period tax cuts for constrained firms and households to allow desired investment and consumption. If such state deficit financing overcomes a failure in the local capital markets, credit-constrained firms and households will be attracted to the state. Again, X, N, and H will rise in equilibrium. Deficit financing of scholarships to state universities may be an example.
Third, if firms and households are myopic and do not anticipate the future tax burdens of state own deficits, then deficits act as de facto fiscal transfers from future (perhaps future self) state residents or, in the case of bailouts, from residents of the full monetary union. Such transfers act to increase current period consumption and investment within the state, leading to an increase in X, N, and H. When deficits are repaid, however, firm and household taxes will rise, causing X, N, and H to fall back to their original equilibrium levels. If the eventual tax consequences of temporary deficits are perceived immediately, then there will be no change in X, N, and H, even in the short run. That is, Ricardian equivalence will hold.
In each case it is plausible to assume a period of adjustment to the new economic equilibrium or, in the case of myopic firms and households, a period before the tax consequences of state deficits are recognized and the economy returns to its original equilibrium; see, for example, Wildasin (2000). We will estimate the effects of temporary own state deficits per capita (OwnD) on annual changes in N and H, each specified as an annual state growth rate ( , ). We will test for the presence of such fiscal spillovers among the 48 mainland states in two ways. Each measure uses an alternative specification of trade linkages between member states to define the reach of spillovers. Direct information on trade flows between U.S. states is not available, however. As a first alternative we combine information on each state's major industries with the national input-output matrix to approximate trade flows between productive enterprises across states.
The matrix is specified by the shares of each of 63 industry inputs needed to produce one dollar of a "buy" state's gross state product multiplied by the national input-output matrix and then multiplied by the share of a "sell" state's production of those 63 industry inputs. The input-output measure of state linkages has the weakness, however, that it is a productionbased measure of state interdependencies and omits the final demands by the household sector for goods and services produced in other states. We therefore offer a second, more inclusive measure of state interdependencies that includes demand by the household sector. In this measure states are grouped by economic regions as specified by Crone (2004) . Crone uses the Philadelphia Federal Reserve Bank's indices of coincident economic activity to first identify the cyclical components of each state's aggregate economy. He then applies cluster analysis to the resulting cyclical components to group the 48 contiguous states into eight regions with similar business cycles. Here the spillover measure connecting states will be the change in economic activity in a state's Crone-specified regional neighbors, excluding the change in the state itself. We call this measure of state interdependence the regional spillover measure, denoted REGSpillovers. Table 1 lists the states in each of the eight economic regions as specified by Crone. 4 Economic activities specified to influence a given state's growth in jobs and population are the jobs and population growth, respectively, for that state's spillover "neighbors." 5 Weightings used to reflect "neighborliness" are either the input-output weights or the Crone-region (state shares)
weights. The correlation of the two measures of spillovers is .47 for job growth spillovers and .24
for population spillovers. We test for spillovers with both specifications. We anticipate the spillover variable based on the more economically inclusive within-region connections to show a larger spillover impact than those obtained using the input-output connections. Finally, both our measures may overstate spillovers among U.S. states, since they ignore purchases from non-U.S. suppliers.
Unfortunately, data on the demand for foreign goods and services by a state's firms and households are not available. Craig and Inman (1982) . Finally, also included in ZAID are payments to states as a result of the 1998 settlement with tobacco companies for reimbursement of state health expenditures due to smoking. As for OwnD, ZAID will be lagged one year in our regressions.
IV. Estimation and Results

A.
The underlying specifications for our job and population growth equations follow from Eqs.
(3)- (5) and REGSpillovers -will be tested separately. Control variables included in each regression are lagged values of the spillover variables as a control for shocks to "neighboring" economies, changes in world energy prices interacted with whether the state is an energy-producing state, and changes in state productivity as measured from the state production function for manufacturing. 7 Our estimation strategy corrects for serial correlation and heteroscedasticity in v st .
Two important econometric issues remain when estimating our growth equations. First is the potential endogeneity of state own deficits, even when lagged one year. Unmeasured shocks to a state's economy will lower the measures of economic performance and at the same time increase the state's deficit. If these unmeasured shocks have an autocorrelated path, then they will be correlated with lagged OwnD and contemporary performance as well. Since deficits rise when the economy declines, the bias is likely to be downward; OLS results reported below confirm this negative bias.
To correct for the possible endogeneity of OwnD, we instrument for OwnD using as instruments four-to six-year lags of OwnD. The identifying assumptions are, first, that deficit changes arising from fiscal choices of preceding legislative regimes have an institutional persistence helping to predict contemporaneous state deficits and, second that those lagged deficit changes are not correlated with the current economic performance of the state except through their impact on OwnD. For example, accumulated cash reserves from prior general fund surpluses or in capital or pension funds available from prior long-term debt each allows for funding current period OwnD.
This first assumption is tested directly using the Stock-Yogo F test for weak instruments in the first stage of the IV regression. For our job growth equation we can reject the null hypothesis of weak instruments at the .95 level of confidence; see Table 2 . For our population growth equation we can reject the null hypothesis of weak instruments at the .90 level of confidence; see Table 3 . The second assumption is supported by the preponderance of macro-economic evidence for the time horizon of fiscal policy impacts as never longer than sixteen quarters and by results from the application of the as a control for potential fiscal competition among economic neighbors. Finally, controlling for region-wide fixed effects had no statistically significant effect on our results.
Hansen and difference-in-Hansen tests for instrument exogeneity; see Tables 2 and 3 . In particular,
see Figure 3 , which shows the estimated impact of state own deficits on the state's economy as exhausted within two years.
Second, each of our growth equations uses state fixed effects to control for state unique variables (A F , A H , and ‹ s ) setting initial conditions. To control for these state fixed effects, each growth equation is estimated in first differences as recommended by Caselli, Esquivel, and Lefort (1996) . Because our data and specification define a dynamic panel, however, the resulting error term in the first differenced estimating equation is likely to be correlated with the first differences of the lagged dependent variables. Thus, the estimated coefficients for the lagged dependent variables will be biased. Holtz-Eakin, Newey, and Rosen (1988) provide an efficient GMM estimator for dynamic panels with fixed effects using long-lagged values of the dependent variables as instruments. There must be no evidence of serial correlation of the within-state errors (v st ) for the longer lags. Arellano and Bond (1991) develop the test for within state serial correlation for second-order and longer lags, and we report those results for our GMM estimates; see Tables 2 and 3 . The preferred GMM estimator also corrects standard errors for heteroscedasticity and first-order autocorrelation. Tables 2 and 3 provides the OLS estimates of the job growth and population growth equations, respectively. Both show a negative correlation between OwnD(-1) and the two outcome variables as would be expected when there are common omitted events causing both the local economy to decline and local deficits to rise. To control for this downward bias we instrument for OwnD(-1) using lags of OwnD(-1) from a previous legislative session, dated four, five, and six fiscal years prior. Prior to GMM estimation, we test for whether these instruments qualify as "strong" instruments for OwnD(-1) from the IV estimation of each equation. Tables 2 and 3 . The threshold value for the F statistic for 10 percent maximal relative bias between OLS and IV estimates is 9.08; see Stock, Wright, and Yogo (2002) . We conclude that lags of (-4) to (-6) for OwnD qualify as strong instruments. In addition, Tables 2 and 3 We conclude that lags of (-4) to (-6) of OwnNetRev and GovServices are strong instruments for the two component fiscal variables of OwnD.
Also important for the validity of our instruments is that they are exogenous to the secondstage job and population growth equations. We use the Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions to test this assumption; see Tables 2 and 3 . We cannot reject the null hypothesis that the instruments can be excluded from the second-stage equations. There is the potential problem in the GMM estimation of dynamic panels, however, that the Hansen test loses its power to identify exclusion when there are many instruments in the first stage where candidate instruments include long-lagged values of the dependent and other included exogenous variables; see Roodman (2008) . Restricting the set of instruments can offer substantial gains in power for exclusion tests; see Bowsher (2002) .
We have done so by limiting the number of lags of the dependent and exogenous variables used as instruments in first-stage estimation to no more than three. In an alternative specification of our core model, we have also estimated our job and population growth equations excluding year fixed effects;
see Tables 2 and 3 Finally, we report the test statistic for the difference-in-Hansen test for exclusion of only our primary instruments for OwnD(-1), OwnNetRev(-1) and GovServices(-1) specified as lags (-4) to (-6) of each variable; by this test too we fail to reject the null hypothesis that the instruments are excluded from the second-stage equations.
Our core results appear in Tables 2 and 3 . After instrumenting for the endogeneity of OwnD(-1), we find that own state deficits now have a positive impact on state job growth one year after deficit spending; see Table 2 , cols. (2)-(5). The GMM estimated coefficients are statistically significant at the 95 percent confidence level and the resulting estimated impact on job growth is economically important. For example, a one-standard-deviation increase in state deficits over the last ten years of our sample period of $390/person will increase the rate of job growth in the subsequent calendar year by .012 (= .00003 x $390; Even the estimates for REGSpillovers may be an underestimate of the full spillover effects. Our referee suggested one additional test for aggregate spillover effects and that was to repeat our core regression but omit year fixed effects. Including year fixed effects not only controls for common macro-economic shocks to state economies but also for the level of deficits in all other states. To the extent that a state's own deficit correlates with other states' deficits in a year -i.e., all states trying to stimulate their economies -these "aggregate" effects will be captured as part of year fixed effects. By omitting year fixed effects, the OwnD(-1) variable could then include these correlated effects of other states' deficits. This alternative specification for job growth appears in Tables 2 and 3 , col. 5. The estimated coefficient for OwnD(-1) remains positive and is statistically significant but is in fact smaller than the estimate with year fixed effects included. Even after including the national rate of unemployment in these regressions, we suspect that omitting controls for year-to-year variation in the aggregate economy leads to a downward bias in the estimate of the effects of OwnD(-1) on state job growth. When the aggregate economy is in decline, state job Tables 2, col. (6) provides separate estimates for the fiscal components of OwnD(-1). State own deficits are defined as spending on government services less state own revenues by all funds.
We follow the specification used in studies of the macro-economic effects of tax policy and define revenues as net state revenues specified as own state revenues collected minus all transfers paid to households including welfare payments, Medicaid payments, unemployment insurance, and pensions for retired public employees. We also deduct state payments to local governments, viewing such payments as transfers to households for local tax relief or local spending. As for own state deficits we lag the variable one year, denoted as OwnNetRev (-1) . Spending on government services is also lagged, denoted as GovServices (-1), and now excludes all transfer payments. Service spending does include wages paid to state public employees, spending on purchased goods and services, and state infrastructure spending. As noted, we instrument for GovServices(-1) and OwnNetRev(-1) with their four-to six-year lags.
OwnNetRev(-1) has a statistically significant negative effect on state job growth. Raising state tax revenues depresses job growth, while returning revenues as transfers to households improve growth. The negative effect of net revenues on job growth is consistent with previous estimates for state and local economies (e.g., Helms, 1985) and for the macro-economy as well (Romer and Romer, 2010) . GovServices(-1) has a positive but statistically insignificant effect on state job growth.
11 This growth is low and state deficits are high. Including year fixed effects controls for this possible bias. Still, to the extent that our estimates with year fixed effects do control for the spillover benefits from other states' deficits, our reported estimates for OwnD(-1) should be viewed as a lower bound to total job effects when all states react in unison.
result too mirrors previous estimates; see Holtz-Eakin (1994) . Importantly for our work here, the revenue and expenditure components provide impact estimates of the same order of magnitude and statistical significance as those for OwnD(-1).
The effects of OwnD(-1) on state population growth through net migration (including possible foreign migrants) are statistically insignificant or, if significant, quantitatively small in impact; see Table 3 , cols. (2)- (5). Similar insignificant effects are observed when OwnD(-1) is separated into OwnNetRev(-1) and GovServices(-1); Table 3 , col. (6). This makes sense if state job gains from the temporary deficit are thought to be short lived, a conclusion consistent with our impulse response function for the effects of OwnD on job growth in Figure 3 . Finally, Table 3 , col. (7) a result suggestive of a region-wide job search by new residents.
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Combining the estimated effects of OwnD(-1) on new jobs, on new residents, and on changes in the rate of state employment allows us to estimate who benefits from the increase in state debt.
Will it be current residents through protection of their existing jobs, current residents through new employment opportunities, or outside residents moving in to "steal" new state jobs? A simple example provides the answer. From Table 2 , col. (4), we find that a one-standard-deviation increase in state deficits of $390 will increase the rate of state job growth by .012 (= .00003 x $390) or, for the average state in our sample with 2.816 million jobs, an increase of 33,800 jobs. From Table 3, col. (7), we estimate that the state rate of employment will rise by .0020 (= .000005 x $390) from its mean of .942 to .944. For the average state's labor force of 2.989 million potential workers, this means saving 6,000 jobs of those already working (= .002 x 2.989 million). Finally, new residents are estimated to take about 7,200 of the new jobs. This follows from fact that the $390/person deficit 12 Two calculations provide a sense of the magnitude of these estimated population effects. First, we estimate that with a one-standard-deviation increase in state own deficits of $390/person, state population growth rates will increase by .0027 (=.000007 x $390) and increase population in the average state by 17,000 new residents (= .0027 x 6.222 million residents). Second, from the spillover variables we can compute the change in populations outside the state. For IOSpillovers, the average "weight" for one state's increase in population growth is .015 so that the deficit state's impact on the value of IOSpillovers will therefore be .00004 (= .0027 x .015). From the estimated spillover effect of -2.004 for IOSpillovers, this means a decline in the population growth rate of each of the other states of about -.00008 (= -2 x .00004) or about 500 residents (= -.00008 x 6.222 million). The typical economic region has six states. Thus 42 states will be "sending" 500 residents each into the region for a total in-migration of 21,000 residents, 17,000 of whom will settle in the original deficit state and 4,000 of whom will settle in the other five states. REGSpillover measures this population gain for the region's other states. The implied regional job search process is reminiscent of the 1950's "Caterpillar trail," where job-seekers from the South went first to Peoria, Illinois (home of Caterpillar Tractor), then to Gary, Chicago, Milwaukee, Green Bay, and finally Minneapolis-St. Paul in search of work.
increases own state population from net migration by about 17,000.
13 About 45 percent of current state residents participate in the labor market. If the new residents participate and are employed at the same rates as current residents, then 7,200 new workers, in jobs, will come from outside the state however, there are no longer significant effects on state jobs. Second, the lack of a permanent effect on jobs suggests that historically at least state deficit financing has not been funding productive new state infrastructure (A F ) or residential amenities (A H ), leading to a permanently more attractive state economy. Third, the observed statistically significant negative effect of today's deficits on jobs eight 13 See footnote 12 above.
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to ten years from the date of deficit financing is consistent with jobs declining when taxes rise to repay debt. This third result rejects strong Ricardian equivalence for state deficit financing. Table 4 provides a policy experiment based on the results in Table 2 , asking what an increase in state own deficits would mean for jobs both in the deficit state ( Three alternative simulations are presented in Table 4 . The upper panel of Table 2 , col. 4. First, we compute the increase in the rate of job growth as Δjob growth = .0109 = .000028 x $390/person. (The coefficients in Table 2 have been rounded to save space.) The predicted rate of job growth is then multiplied by actual employment in each state in 2009 to obtain the predicted level of new jobs. 16 The largest state's predicted increase in employment is added to existing growth for each of the state's regional neighbors to obtain a new estimate of each neighboring state's REGSpillovers. That value is then multiplied by the estimated coefficient for impact of REGSpillovers on job growth from Table 2 , col. (4) (= .685) to obtain a new value of each neighbor's job growth. Each neighbor's new jobs are then estimated as the new growth rate times the neighbor's existing employment in 2009. Neighbors' new jobs are then summed to obtain the estimate of "spillovers to other states" reported in Table 4 .
V. Local Deficits and Local Jobs
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Three conclusions are evident from Table 4 . First, from the first row of the first two panels (OWN JOBS), state own deficits can create state jobs, at least for one year. But sizeable deficits will be required. The present value tax cost/job created in the state for the state running the deficits ranges from $72,000 per job in Massachusetts to $91,000 per job in California. These cost estimates are comparable to those obtained by the recent evaluative literature of the impact of the American Reinvestment and Recovery Act's fiscal assistance to state and local governments on local job growth; see, for example, Wilson (2012).
Second, there can be significant aggregate job spillovers onto the deficit state's neighbors.
The costs of these "spillover jobs" will be $0 for the neighbors. This spillover benefit creates a strong incentive for the neighbors of the largest state to free-ride on that state's deficit behavior. For comparable deficit levels, large states can often create more jobs for its neighbors than the neighbors can create for themselves. For example, in the Far West region, spillovers from California (108,561) exceed its neighbors' own job creation (90,301).
The second panel in Table 4 shows that the incentive to free-ride runs both ways. If the largest state's neighbors were to collectively increase their deficits, but the large state did not, then the large state would receive the spillover jobs. Collectively then, all states may choose to "sit on their hands," hoping that the other states in the region will run deficits in times of recessions. Or if each state does run a deficit to create jobs within the state -as would occur if the state benefits of a new job exceed the state's own tax cost/job -there will likely be a downward adjustment in own state's deficit behavior to the job spillovers received from the other states. The Nash equilibrium to such a "race to the bottom" policy game will be Pareto inferior to a cooperative allocation in which all states collectively agree to deficit finance region-wide job creation; see Pauly (1970) .
Third, the lower panel of Table 4 shows the outcome of such a cooperative policy, if all states in the region agreed to run a common $390/person deficit. Total jobs created is the sum of total jobs created when the two sets of governments operated separately (REGION'S TOTAL JOBS) and tax cost/job becomes the weighted average of cost/job after allowing for spillovers. The tax cost/job under the cooperative policy is significantly lower than when each state, or set of states, operated independently ignoring spillovers. For example, in the New England region the "private" cost/job to Massachusetts of the deficit policy would be $72,103, or to the other smaller states $76,724, but working together and allowing for spillover jobs, the "social" cost/job falls to $44,250. A deficit policy that was not attractive for an individual state when comparing the benefits of a state job to its own tax costs may become attractive when all states agree to cooperate and collectively share the deficit costs of job creation.
17 If so, then there is an argument for centralizing stabilization fiscal policy.
VI. Conclusion
The accepted wisdom for managing stabilization policy in an economic and monetary union, as summarized by the opening quote from Oates, assigns these policy responsibilities to the central government for either or both of two reasons. First, no state can have a significant impact on its own level of economic activity as firms and households within the state purchase much of their inputs and 17 Though that decision must ultimately rest on the net social benefits of moving residents from unemployment to employment. Whether these net benefits of a created job exceed our estimated social costs remains an open question. For example, as part of an effort to understand fluctuations in employment rates, Hall and Milgrom (2008, Table 2 ) estimate the annual (flow) benefits to a risk-neutral worker of remaining unemployed (and searching or providing home production) as 70 percent of the overall gain in added output. The net social surplus of moving from unemployed to employed would therefore be 30 percent of the worker's added output. It is this net output benefit that must be compared to our computed costs. For risk-averse workers, the required output gain would be smaller. consumption from producers outside the state. As a result, the primary beneficiary of any temporary fiscal stimulus will be workers outside the state because of economic spillovers. Second, even without significant spillovers, workers from other states may move into the state adopting the fiscal stimulus with the consequence that job opportunities will not improve for state residents. In either case, state officials may under-provide job creation policies for their residents. If so, only the central government can implement efficient macro-stabilization policies.
Our results here suggest that for the U.S. economic union the familiar conclusion is correct.
While states can implement effective deficit policies and the primary beneficiaries of the resulting increases in state jobs will be state residents, the present value costs per job of such policies to each individual state -ranging from $70,000 to $90,000 per job -may exceed the benefits of the jobs created. After allowing for the resulting positive job spillovers to neighboring states, however, the social cost of created jobs falls to $45,000 to $50,000 per job. What may not be optimal from the perspective on an individual state may be justified collectively because of spillovers. If so, only a central government, or a fiscal treaty as in the case of the European Union, will be capable of coordinating state deficits for efficient fiscal stabilization policies.
Whether central government policy-makers will be able to achieve efficient coordination of state fiscal policies is another matter, however. Within fiscal unions, the central government typically relies on state or provincial governments for the implementation of its domestic fiscal policies, including transfers to households. Rather than spending funds as the central government desires, states often have their own policy agendas. Having now examined states as their own "principals," the next task for understanding stabilization policy in economic unions should be to evaluate states as "agents" for central government fiscal policies. 
OwnD ( for all variables are for this sample. All regressions include state fixed effects; the GMM estimator uses a differenced specification to remove state fixed effects. All equations also include one and two lags of the dependent variable. Coefficients for the oneyear lag of the dependent variable range from .47 (for REGSpillovers) to .60 (for all other specifications) and are statistically significant at the .95 level of confidence; the coefficient for the two-year lag is typically near -.10 and never statistically significant. Other variables included in all regressions are lagged measures of the spillover variable, a measure of shocks to state manufacturing productivity, and shocks to the price of oil interacted with whether the state is an oil-producing state. For the one regression excluding year fixed effects (col. 5) we included the national rate of unemployment as a control for the national economy and the coefficient estimate was negative and statistically significant. Standard errors are reported within parentheses. Estimates indicated by ** are significant at the .95 level of confidence and those by * at the .90 level of confidence. 
